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I. Introduction and Summary
In the 1973 report of the National Water Commission (NWC Report), more
attention is given to exotic means of enhancing water supplies, such as
icebergs, fog drip and transport of collapsible water-containing bladders than
to hydroelectricity (hydro). The NWC Report does have a section on "power
production," but it is about the use of water to cool thermal power plants and
not at all about hydro. In short, hydro was the orphan child of water policy in
the NWC Report.
The absence of analysis of hydro, western or otherwise, in the NWC Report
seems strange today but is understandable. It likely derives from the fact
that in 1973 the production of hydro did not seem to be causing any problems.
Indeed, hydro may have seemed an unalloyed good, providing cheap,
renewable power and standing ready to help western irrigators repay the
cost of reclamation projects. Few apparently saw a need to address hydro for
environmental or for any other reason.
Has the world changed enough since 1973 to warrant a closer look at western
hydro? Without question, it has. First, electric-industry restructuring has
placed hydro, like all power generation technologies, under the stress of
competition. The question is whether hydro can survive in a world in which
the power grid is open and in which the cost of power in the West has
dropped precipitously to historic real lows. Second, there is a much better
understanding—although far from perfect—of the role of hydropower
production in damage to the aquatic environment. Can we mitigate hydro's
damage to the environment at the same time that hydro is under financial
pressure because of industry restructuring?
Third, there are forces in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere which favor
"privatization" of federal hydro capacity. What are the likely impacts of
privatization of federal hydro? What's the outlook for privatization in
Congress? Fourth is a range of federal hydro repayment and subsidy issues
that have more poignancy in an era of federal budget deficits and possible
privatization. These issues make hydro a more compelling subject for
analysis in 1997 than in 1973.
This paper1 describes the West's hydro system and the major players
involved in marketing hydro, discusses the major issues swirling around
hydro and draws the principal conclusions that we believe this analysis
suggests.

1

This paper has not been peer reviewed.
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II. The Facts
We begin with some key facts about the West's hydro resources.

A. Overview
Total installed hydro capacity in the United States, according to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), is 73,494 megawatts, or roughly
10% of total national electric generation capacity.2 (By comparison coal, is
used in 40% of the nation's generation capacity.)3 However, in the West,
especially in the Pacific Northwest, hydro plays a larger role.
Table 1 sets forth the amount, in megawatts (MW), of installed hydro
capacity by western water resource region.

Table 1.—Hydroelectric capacity in the West by water resource
Region

Number
of plants

Installed
capacity

Average
plant size

Missouri River Basin
Arkansas-White-Red
Rio Grande
Upper Colorado
Lower Colorado
Great Basin
Pacific Northwest
California

76
31
7
34
21
76
314
410

3,719
1,966
153
1,823
2,412
235
31,998
9,162

50
63
22
54
115
3
102
22

Regional total
U.S. total
Region as percent of U.S. total

969
2,304
42%

51,468
73,494
70%

53
32

Source: Hydroelectric Power Resources in the United States, FERC, 1992

2
"Hydroelectric Power Resources in the U.S.," Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
1992.
3
"Annual Energy Review, 1996," U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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As table 1 shows, there are 51,468 megawatts of installed hydro capacity on
western river basins. This is roughly 70% of national hydro capacity. And it
amounts to about one-third of all installed electric generation capacity in the
region, a substantially higher percentage than its share nationally. The
higher percentage of hydro in the West is largely a result of hydro's dominant
position in the Pacific Northwest where hydro comprises about 68% of all
generation capacity.
Not only is the West the home of most of the nation's hydro capacity, it is also
the home of 9 out of the 10 largest dams in the U.S. Table 2 lists the top ten
dams by size and owner.

Table 2.—Ten largest hydroelectric plants in the U.S.
Plant

Owner/Operator

Size
(MW)

Grand Coulee

BOR

6,180

Chief Joseph

BOR

2,457

John Day

BOR

2,160

R. Moses Niagara

PASNY

1,950

Hoover

BOR

1,935

The Dalles

COE

1,806

Glen Canyon

BOR

1,288**

Rocky Reach

Chelan County

1,260

Bonneville

COE

1,092

Boundary

Seattle

1,033

** Before re-operation.
Source: Hydroelectric Power Resources of the U.S., FERC, 1992.

B. Ownership of Hydro Facilities
It helps to explain the West's hydropower resource by reference to ownership
because ownership determines the regulatory policies and political pressures
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under which the capacity operates. In this regard, hydro facilities fall into
two general groups—federal and non-federal—and, within those groups, into
smaller categories.
Many think of the West as being almost the exclusive province of the large
federal dams, like Hoover, Grand Coulee, Chief Joseph and Glen Canyon.
Table 2 appears to support that viewpoint: All but one of the nine largest
dams in the West are owned and operated by the federal government. Yet,
surprisingly, federal dams comprise only about 55% of total hydro capacity in
the West. Table 3 sets forth hydro facilities by owner and capacity in 11
western states.

Table 3.—Hydroelectric facilities in the West, by owner
(In 1992, megawatts)
State
Montana

Federal

Municipa
l

Utility

PURPA

Total

Percent
of total

1,367

10

984

4

2,366

5

Idaho

833

156

1,044

209

2,241

5

Wyoming

257

3

1

0

260

1

Colorado

482

32

40

10

564

1

24

52

0

0

76

0

2,443

90

7

0

2,540

5

155

52

50

1

258

1

1,030

4

10

0

1,044

2

13,707

8,021

866

32

22,626

48

Oregon

3,945

224

1,082

16

5,268

11

California

2,068

3,942

3,761

131

9,902

21

26,312

12,585

7,846

403

47,145

100

56

27

17

1

New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Washington

Total
Percent of total
1

1

100

The total shown in this table is less than that shown in Table 1 because the water resource regions shown
in
that table contain more territory than the 11 states depicted in this table.
Source: FERC Hydroelectric Resources of the U.S.
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This table shows that, in California, federal hydro capacity is only 21% of
total hydro capacity. Even in Washington, the home of the three largest
hydro facilities in the U.S.—Grand Coulee, Chief Joseph and John Day—nonfederal hydro capacity is about 40% of the total. Privately owned and
municipal utilities have made heavy investments in hydro capacity in some
western states, notably in the Pacific Northwest and California. In Idaho
small non-utility facilities encouraged by the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA) comprise 10% of total capacity.
1. Federal Hydro
Federal hydro facilities in the West, while constructed and operated by the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE),
are best described with reference to the two federal power marketing
administrations (PMAs) that market western federal hydropower: The
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and the Western Area Power
Administration (Western). BPA markets federal hydropower principally in
the four PNW states (Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana). In the
interior West, California, and the upper plains states, federal hydropower is
marketed by Western. In Oklahoma and in portions of Kansas and Texas (as
well as in Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri), federal hydropower is
marketed by the Southwestern Power Administration. Near the border with
Mexico, two federal projects are operated by the International Boundary
Water Commission, but the power from these projects is marketed by
Western. In this report we focus on BPA and Western.
a. Bonneville Power Administration.—Created in 1937, BPA markets power
to 193 customers4 from 29 federal hydro plants5 on the Columbia and Snake
Rivers and their tributaries with a total capacity of close to 20,000 MW.
From these resources, BPA provides about 40% of the PNW's firm power over
high voltage power lines owned by the United States that represent more
than 50% of the region's transmission capacity. Most of the energy is sold at
wholesale to electric utilities. A small portion is sold directly to the region's
aluminum companies.
Among the many statutory authorities that affect BPA's operations are
individual reclamation project authorizations, the Bonneville Project Act, the
Flood Control Act of 1944, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and

Most of BPA's utility customers are "preference power" customers, primarily public and
private, non-profit cooperative entities and tribes who, by statute, are entitled to first call on
the power from federal hydro plants.
5
These dams are identified in Attachment A.
4
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Conservation Act of 1978 (Regional Act) and the Endangered Species Act.
Some key policies that are included in these enactments are:
1. Federal dams in the Upper Snake River in Idaho from which BPA
markets hydropower were constructed primarily for the purpose of
irrigation. Power is a secondary or incidental purpose. Most other
Columbia River Basin facilities were constructed and are operated
primarily to generate hydropower.
2. BPA is required to recover in power rates not only the capital,
operating and maintenance costs of the hydro plants but also over
$500 million annually of defunct nuclear power plant costs incurred in
the 1970s by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS).6
For the next six years at least, BPA has also agreed to spend $252
million annually for salmon recovery costs7.
3. BPA is a utility, like other utilities responsible for acquiring new
resources to meet the loads of customers who choose to place their
growing load requirements on BPA.
4. BPA's electric resource acquisitions as well as its investments in fish
recovery, are subject to guidance (that favors energy efficiency,
renewable resources and fish protection) by the Northwest Power
Planning Council, a four state/eight member regional compact
organization created in the 1978 Regional Act.
5. Municipal utilities, non-profit cooperative utilities, tribes and other
public agencies are given a preference for the purchase of electricity
from BPA.
6. Hydropower production by BOR and COE facilities is now understood
to play a major role in the endangerment of salmon species in the
region, encouraging pressure for change from federal and state
agencies, the tribes, fishing interests and environmental
organizations.
As explained in more detail in Section III, BPA is under financial stress in
1997, largely attributable to the fact that its rates are at or slightly above the
cost of alternative supplies of power available on the wholesale power
market while, at the same time, most of its power sale contracts expire by
"BPA on the Brink," American Rivers, 1995.
See "Memorandum of Agreement among Department of Army, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy and the department of Interior Concerning the
Bonneville Power Administration's Financial Commitment for the Columbia River
Basin Fish and Wildlife Costs," September 16, 1996.
6
7
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2001. On the other hand, once nuclear plant debt is retired (by 2012), BPA
power will likely again be a bargain.
The financial pressures facing BPA helped lead to the creation of the
Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System, a year-long
collaborative effort among a group of PNW stakeholders convened by the
region's four governors. The goal of the review was to develop
recommendations regarding the restructuring of the region's electric
industry, in part so as to retain the long-run benefits of the BPA system for
the region.
The effort resulted in the December, 1996, report entitled "Toward a
Competitive Electric Power Industry for the 21st Century." Among the
recommendations adopted by the review's Steering Committee are measures
to encourage continuing reliance on BPA for power supplies during the period
when its rates may be above-market and a proposal to break BPA into two
entities, one owning BPA's transmission system and the other owning and
marketing hydropower. One Steering Committee member dissented from the
report stating his opinion that no regional consensus on power issues is
possible absent resolution of how the hydro system should be re-operated to
recover endangered salmon stocks, an issue which the Committee recognized
but did not resolve.8
b. Western Area Power Administration.—Western was created in 1977 with
the enactment of the Department of Energy Reorganization Act. Western
markets power from 55 federal hydro plants containing about 10,000 MW of
capacity and located in the Colorado, Sacramento/San Joaquin, Missouri and
Rio Grande river basins.9 This power is sold in 16 states stretching from
California to Minnesota to about 640 customers, almost all of them wholesale
preference power utilities. Western also operates an extensive transmission
system, containing nearly 17,000 miles of line. The largest dams—all but
Oahe operated by the BOR—from which Western markets power are Hoover
Dam (2074 MW, AZ/NV), Glen Canyon Dam (1356 MW, AZ), Shasta Dam
(578 MW, CA) and Oahe Dam (786 MW, SD).10 Western's total sales of
power, including resales of fossil-fuel power Western purchases to meet its
contract demands, have averaged between 40% and 50% of BPA's total sales
in recent years.

8
"Final Report, Toward a Competitive Electric Power Industry for the 21st Century,"
Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System, December 12, 1996, Concurring
and Dissenting Views of Rick Applegate, West Coast Conservation Director, Trout
Unlimited.
9
"Western Area Power Administration, Annual Report, 1996," p. 8.
10
A complete listing of dams from which Western markets power is provided in
Attachment B.
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Western's electric rates, like BPA's, are subject to review and confirmation
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Otherwise, Western
operates with considerable discretion under authorities contained in project
authorizations, the Flood Control Act of 1944, the DOE Organization Act of
1977 and the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) and caselaw.
Western's vast system is broken down into four regions (Desert Southwest,
Sierra Nevada, Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains). Electric rates are
set to recover the costs of 14 different projects in eleven different rate pools.11
Among the key policies under which Western operates are:
1. Western markets power from projects authorized primarily for nonpower purposes—for example, flood control and navigation in the
Missouri River Basin and irrigation and river regulation in the
Colorado River Basin, distinguishing these projects from most projects
from which BPA markets hydro.
2. Western's rates presently are less freighted with the recovery of nonhydro costs than BPA's. However, Western's power customers are
ultimately on the hook for about double the amount of irrigation costs
than BPA's customers. Colorado River Storage Project power users
are even paying to finance irrigation facilities that are not yet and
may never be built.
3. Unlike BPA, Western is not a utility, having an obligation only to
meet contract electric demands but not load growth.
4. Contrary to BPA, neither Western's electric resource acquisitions nor
its fish-recovery investments are subject to guidance by a regional
policy-setting compact commission. Under section 114 of EPACT,
Western's customers are required to prepare Integrated Resource
Plans (IRP) showing how they will integrate energy conservation and
environmental considerations into their use of power provided by
Western.
5. Western's power sales, like BPA's, are governed by preference clauses
that enable public and quasi-public agencies to exercise an option to
purchase electricity from Western within available supplies.
Western is not under the same financial stress in 1997 as BPA. Power from
Western still generally costs less than the power of the same quality
available in the market. However, like all other electricity sellers, Western is
not immune to competitive pressures. As the power grid continues to open,

11
See "Western Area Power Administration, Appendix to the Annual Report, 1996,"
p. 1, 19.
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alternative low-cost supplies are becoming available to Western's customers.
However, unlike BPA, Western's power sale contracts expire on a staggered
basis beginning in 2000.
Adding to the worries occasioned by competitive pressures, environmental
organizations want Western's power customers to pay for environmental
mitigation associated with the hydro plants. Administration and
congressional budget deficit hawks would like to accelerate Western's
recovery of both power and irrigation costs. And investor-owned utilities and
others see enormous value in Hoover Dam and other hydro plants and
Western's transmission assets that might be translated into profits if these
assets could be privatized.
2. Non-Federal Hydro
The roughly 20,000 MW of hydro capacity in the West that is non-federal is
regulated under the Federal Power Act (FPA). Under Part 1 of the FPA,
nearly all non-federal owners of hydro plants must obtain a license from the
FERC in order to construct and operate these plants.12
Until 1986 the FERC and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), acted as if they had been directed by Congress solely to promote
hydropower generation on the nation's rivers, in the opinion of
environmental organizations in disregard of the impact on the riverine
environment and, in the opinion of many states, in disregard of state water
law. In 1986 Congress amended the FPA's hydro licensing provisions to
require balance in the implementation of these authorities. In particular,
Congress required the FERC—
In deciding whether to issue any license...in addition to the power and
development purposes for which licenses are issued, ...[to] give equal
consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the protection,
mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife...the
protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of other
aspects of environmental quality.

FERC's licensing jurisdiction extends to hydropower dams that (1) occupy federal
lands or reservations, (2) are located on navigable streams, (3) use surplus water from a
federal dam or (4) were constructed after 1935 and are located on a non-navigable stream
that affects the interests of interstate or foreign commerce (including providing power to the
grid.) See "River Renewal, Restoring Rivers Through Hydropower Dam Relicensing," May
1996, American Rivers and the National Park Service. Small hydropower dams, with less
than 5 MW of capacity, may apply for an exemption from the licensing provisions of the FPA.
See 18 CFR 4.90 et. seq.
12
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Section 4(e), FPA. Still unresolved, however, is the tension between the
FERC and state river policies.
The greatest effect of this change in legislative direction is felt at the relicensing stage. That is, in the 1990s the FERC receives relatively few
applications for new licenses to construct and operate major new hydro
plants. However, many existing licenses, usually issued for fifty years, are
expiring and must be renewed in a process known as relicensing. Starting in
1993 the initial FERC licenses of many of the nation's non-federal dams
began to expire in big numbers. In 1993 160 licenses affecting 237 dams on
105 rivers expired. Another 550 more dams are due for relicensing by 2010.13
The "equal consideration" requirement set forth above applies at relicensing,
giving environmental advocates, fish and wildlife agencies and others a new
opportunity to mitigate environmental damage caused by the nation's stock
of non-federal hydro plants. Indeed, environmental organizations have used
this opportunity to negotiate mitigation of environmental damage associated
with a number of non-federal hydro plants.14 However, as in the case of BPA
and Western, non-federal dam owners worry about the impact of the cost of
mitigation measures on the price of hydropower in newly competitive
electricity markets.
The initial licenses of nearly 13,500 MW of hydro capacity, or about twothirds of the West's non-federal hydro capacity, expire between 1997 and
2010.15 Most of this capacity is located in the Pacific Northwest and
California. Thus, the stage is set for some significant contests before the
FERC over the operation of much of the non-federal hydro generation
capacity in this region.
Under PURPA non-utilities were encouraged to invest in cogeneration and
small power facilities (QFs), including small hydro power plants. Among the
benefits extended to PURPA QFs was a guaranteed rate for sale of power
equal to a utility's "avoided costs." Relatively high utility avoided costs
encouraged investors in small hydro plants to file license or exemption
applications with the FERC in enormous numbers in the early 1980s.
However, avoided costs began a decline in the mid-1980s from which they
have not recovered. This has hurt the market for small hydro facilities
financed under the provisions of PURPA. Only a little more than 400 MW of
PURPA QF small hydro capacity is now in place in the West.
"Relicense Forecast, 1993-2010," Office of Hydropower Licensing, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., December, 1993.
14
See "River Renewal, Restoring Rivers Through Hydropower Dam Relicensing,"
May 1996, American Rivers and the National Park Service.
15
Attachment C lists the western non-federal dams that are subject to relicensing
between 1997 and 2010.
13
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III. The Issues
This section discusses the key issues that western hydro faces in 1997. They
include:
•

The impact of electric-industry restructuring on hydro;

•

Pressure to mitigate the impacts of hydro on the aquatic environment
and on recreational values;

•

Interest in the privatization of federal hydro facilities; and

•

Whether BPA and Western are repaying to the U.S. Treasury the
costs for which they are liable and related subsidy issues.

A. Electric Industry Restructuring
The supply of electricity to the typical retail customer of an electric utility is
the result of a three-step process: the generation of the power, its
transmission from the power plant to the general area where it is used and
its distribution to individual customers. Until recently, this three-step
process was understood to be a "natural monopoly." That is, it was assumed
that electricity could be generated, transmitted and distributed and then sold
less expensively by only one provider in any geographical area, as long as
that provider was subject to regulation to prevent monopoly profits.
The events of the last 25 years have robbed generation, if not transmission
and distribution, of its natural-monopoly status. Among other things, new,
highly efficient ways of combusting natural gas combined with low gas prices
have enabled non-utility power producers to generate power for less cost
than many utilities, many of whom are saddled with expensive nuclear,
PURPA QF and coal-fired capacity. Moreover, federal legislation and
regulation, starting with PURPA in 1978 and culminating in 1996 with the
issuance of FERC Order No. 888, have encouraged non-utility power
generation and opened up the transmission grid so that new, cheap power
supplies can reach distant markets. The next step, one that about a dozen
states16 have already taken, is to require the local utility to allow its retail
customers to buy power from whomever they want, so-called "retail
wheeling."

In the West, Arizona, California and Montana have made a commitment to implement
retail electricity competition. Nevada seems poised to do so. Virtually all other western
states are studying it.
16
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The adjustments the electric industry is making to accommodate competition
in power generation are collectively known as "restructuring." Among the
many implications of restructuring is that past investments in generation
capacity that cost more than power available on the open market are
vulnerable to being "stranded," that is, left without a revenue stream to cover
their costs. Estimates of strandable generation costs in the U.S. range as
high as $250 billion.
In theory, investments in hydro are strandable. Whether there is a real
threat that hydro will be stranded depends on a comparison of the costs of
hydro with power available on the market. Unfortunately, this comparison is
fraught with difficulty, in part because it is impossible to know the market
prices of power in the future. Moreover, the cost of hydro on a per-kilowatthour basis in any year depends on variable precipitation levels: the more
precipitation, the lower the price, assuming adequate levels of storage. In
addition, there are various kinds of power now available on the market,
among them spot, short- and long-term firm, complicating the comparison.
Nonetheless, we have ventured a comparison.
Spot-market power has been available off the western grid in recent months
for as little as 10-20 mills per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Short-term firm and
long-term firm power costs more, in the range of 20-30 and 30-40 mills/kWh
respectively. How do hydro costs compare with these prices? We made no
study of the costs of non-federal hydro for this report. As a general matter,
however, hydropower generated from old non-federal plants, those that are
approaching re-licensing, is inexpensive because much of the capital costs of
the facilities have been recovered through electric rates by now. As well, of
course, hydro carries no "fuel" cost. On the other hand, some older nonfederal hydro plants are due for rehabilitation. In addition, non-federal
hydro that is owned by for-profit entities must be priced to earn a profit on
equity investment, a cost of capital that exceeds that of the debt capital used
to finance non-profit hydro. Taking these factors into account, we believe
that much non-federal hydro, even when priced to recover both capital and
operating costs, is competitive with long-term firm power available on the
market if not, perhaps, with spot prices. An exception may be recently
constructed hydro plants, especially those financed under PURPA contracts
that time has proven to be above-market.
Much federal hydro enjoys the same cost advantages as non-federal hydro
and some of its own, including federal financing at low interest rates and
flexibility of repayment of debt. However, as discussed above, the sale of
federal hydro is encumbered with the recovery of other costs, including for
BPA regional nuclear power plant debt. BPA's average electricity rate in
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1996 was 25 mills per kWh.17 This appears to compare favorably with longterm firm power available on the market but is likely about equal to or even
slightly above PNW short-term firm power supplies. Many utilities in the
West are buying only short-term firm power supplies until they understand
better the path of restructuring. The result is that the price of BPA's firm
power in 1996 had no clear price advantage in today's PNW energy market.
Western's rates appear to compare more favorably with market prices.
Table 4 summarizes the results of an estimate we made of the value of
energy purchased from Western, as measured by the difference between
Western's rates and the cost of power on the market.
Our assumptions regarding Western's rates were developed on the basis of
Western's rates today and discussion with Western employees and others
regarding the trajectory of the rates in the future. Our assumptions of
market prices of power in the Western regions are based on discussions with
utilities and power brokers in each of the five rate regions for which we
prepared the estimate. Our market price assumptions, which imply real
growth in the price of long-term firm power of 2% per annum, reflect natural
gas price forecasts in the mid-level range. Finally, in preparing the estimate,
we used a 10% discount rate and we assumed a level of sales based on the
continuation for twenty years of power sale contracts that are in place today.
Obviously, time could prove our assumptions and estimate wrong. For
example, some foresee real declines in the price of power in the West,
attributable to new, cheaper generation technologies. Others believe that
power prices will rise more rapidly than we assumed, especially if natural gas
prices increase. As a result, we present Table 4 only as a reasonable
illustration of our contention that there is considerable value inherent in
electricity purchased from Western over the next twenty years. Table 4 is
certainly not a forecast.
Table 4 suggests that Western power at rates that are available for twenty
years is very competitive with long-term power supplies in the West. Indeed,
we estimate that the net present value of the difference between projected
Western rates and assumed long-term firm alternatives may exceed $5
billion systemwide over the next 20 years. Western's long-term firm power
even appears competitive with short-term firm power supplies.
Table 4 suggests that hydro purchases from Western are a good deal,
although not as good a deal as they were prior to the onset of restructuring.
In an era in which electric customers in the United States increasingly

17

"Fast Facts," Bonneville Power Administration, 1997.
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Table 4.—Estimate of western vs. market revenue streams for long-term,
firm power in the West
(1998-2018)
Power Marketing Region

2000

2005

2010

2015

Pick-Sloan/Upper Great Plains
WAPA’s Rates - mills/kWh:

14.5

15.5

18.0

19.7

Projected Market Rates:

31.2

34.4

38.0

42.0

Net Present Value of Difference Over
20 Years:

$1.708 Billion

Sierra Nevada
WAPA’s Rates - mills/kWh:

19.6

20.8

22.0

23.3

Projected Market Rates:

33.8

37.3

41.2

45.5

Net Present Value of Difference Over
20 Years:

$1.278 Billion

Salt Lake City Area/Integrated Projects
WAPA’s Rates - mills/kWh:

20.2

20.9

22.1

23.3

Projected Market Rates:

31.2

34.5

38.1

42.0

Net Present Value of Difference Over
20 Years:

$0.952 Billion

Loveland/Rocky Mountain
WAPA’s Rates - mills/kWh:

24.5

27.5

30.0

31.7

Projected Market Rates:

28.6

31.6

34.9

38.5

Net Present Value of Difference Over
20 Years:

$0.086 Billion

Desert Southwest
WAPA’s Rates - mills/kWh:

11.6

12.2

12.9

13.7

Projected Market Rates:

31.2

34.5

38.1

42.0

Net Present Value of Difference Over
20 Years:

$1.748 Billion

TOTAL NPV of Delta Over 20 Years System-Wide:

$5.739 Billion
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purchase power from competitive markets, some are asking how the value of
the Western resource—the difference between Western's cost-based rates
and market power prices—should be allocated. Should all of the value flow to
preference power users, more or less the situation today under existing law?
Should some flow to the taxpayer to reduce the federal deficit? Should some
go to environmental mitigation on the rivers from which Western markets
power? What happens to this value if there is privatization? Would it leave
the region? Who should answer these questions?
We conclude that, in general, western hydro can survive utility restructuring.
Even on the BPA system hydro would be competitive but for the load it
carries of nuclear power plant costs.

B. Environmental Mitigation
The impacts that dams can have on the aquatic environment and on
recreation are well-known. They include:
•

Blockage of rivers, harming fish migration and spawning as well as
certain kinds of water-based recreation

•

Alteration of the timing and magnitude of flows, harming the same
values

•

Alteration of water temperature, harming fish spawning

•

Alteration of the chemical make-up of downstream flows, harming fish
and, possibly, even human health

•

Entrapment of nutrients and sediment, harming riparian habitat and
related values

•

Diverting fish through hydropower turbines, injuring or killing them.

The river basin studies submitted to the Water Commission reveal that some
or all of these problems exist in every major river basin in the West. These
studies also suggest that the generation of hydropower, as one of several
uses of western dams, contributes to these impacts in ways that are often
hard to quantify and that vary by river basin.
Perhaps nowhere is it easier to make the case that hydro is a root cause of
damage to fish than in the PNW. John Volkman's report, "A River in
Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy,"
describes how dams constructed solely or primarily for power production
15
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have contributed to the decimation of salmon stocks in the region. Yet, even
in this region, there appear to be other causes of the problem, including
consumptive water uses, navigation requirements, flood control, forest
practices and ocean conditions.
Dale Pontius's report on the Colorado River Basin describes the role that
hydropower production at the Glen Canyon Dam for peaking purposes had in
altering riparian habitat and recreational values below the dam. Yet in this
basin it is hard to avoid the conclusion that hydropower production, often
only an incidental use of the water impounded behind the dams, is but one of
several causes of damage to the ecosystem of the basin. Consumptive water
uses and river regulation for compact purposes also appear to contribute to
the damage.
Elsewhere, hydro's role in degrading western river environments appears
spotty. In California, operation of Shasta dam for hydro purposes
contributed to a large decline in certain chinook salmon runs, but certainly
other uses of water at the dam and at other non-hydro facilities have made
significant contributions to the problem.18 It is hard to argue with the
proposition that it is irrigation that has had the most impacts on the natural
environment in the Central Valley. On the Platte system, Leo Eisel and
David Aiken's report shows how past operation of Kinglsey Dam for hydro
has contributed to downstream environmental problems, but irrigation, as in
the Central Valley, appears also to contribute significantly to the
deterioration of the natural systems of the river.
On the Rio Grande, it appears to be difficult to pin responsibility for
environmental problems mainly on hydro because of the small size of the
river's hydro plants as well as the relatively greater importance of other river
uses. Finally, it is our impression that the impact of operation of hydro
capacity on the mainstem of the Missouri River on fish and other
environmental values, as opposed to operation for flood control and
navigation, is not yet well understood.
Partly because it has caused environmental damage and partly because it is
perceived as the "deep pocket" of western project water uses, federal hydro
has been asked to contribute in two basic ways to environmental mitigation
on western waterways: re-operation and raising money for mitigation
investments from power sales. The clearest example of re-operation is at
Glen Canyon Dam, in which flows through the power turbines formerly were
maximized to meet regional peak electric demands but now mimic more

See "Restoring the West's Waters: Opportunities for the Bureau of Reclamation,
Volume I, Section 2.15, Shasta dam, Central Valley Project, Sacramento River, California,"
Natural Resources Law Center, February, 1996
18
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closely natural flows. In addition to paying for the EIS that was prepared to
determine the new flow regime at the dam, Glen Canyon power users also
must also pay for replacement for the roughly 700 MW of peak power that
was lost as a result of the re-operation. BOR and COE dams on the
Columbia have also been re-operated for fish recovery purposes, with the
consequent loss of power revenues to BPA.
BPA power users in the PNW also pay for the capital costs of mitigation
through their power rates. However, as Section II discussed, it is at best
questionable whether electricity users can be counted on to pay whatever it
costs to recover the fish in a competitive electricity market, at least for as
long as these power users also have to pay to retire nuclear power plant
costs. In addition, since it appears that there are other causes of damage to
fish stocks, there remains the question whether it is equitable to impose the
entire regional burden for fish recovery on BPA power users.
On the Western system power users on the Upper Colorado River help pay
for endangered fish recovery efforts, in particular the Recovery
Implementation Plan for Upper Colorado River endangered fish. As in the
PNW, the federal government continues to help pay for fish restoration in the
Colorado River Basin. Subsection A, above, suggests that competitive
electricity market conditions are not a bar to Western power users paying a
larger share of environmental mitigation and protection measures
throughout the area served by its customers.19 However, there is again the
question of whether it is equitable to ask Western power users to pay an
ever-increasing amount for such efforts when other uses of river water in the
Western system appear to make significant contributions to environmental
damage. On the other hand, assessing power for the costs of environmental
mitigation spreads the cost among millions of people in the region, since
virtually everyone in the areas served by Western's customers uses
electricity.
Finally, there seems to be little question that non-federal hydro capacity has
contributed to aquatic environmental damage in the region, especially in the
PNW. The major opportunity to encourage non-federal owners of hydro
capacity to contribute to mitigation—as BPA hydro users have for years—is
in the dozens of relicensing cases now just getting underway before the
FERC. We feel sure that some of these owners will argue that competitive
market conditions limit their ability to re-operate their facilities for the fish
and to invest in mitigation measures. In response, others will argue that to

It appears that, with the possible exception of the Upper Colorado River Basin, less is
known than in the PNW about the measures, and their costs, that would be appropriate to
implement to mitigate environmental damage on rivers from which Western markets
hydropower.
19
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fail to take these steps externalizes to the environment real costs of hydro
production. Thus, these relicensing cases will join major issues of energy and
environmental policies on the region's rivers. Interestingly, the issues will be
resolved by a distant federal agency with, at the moment, no commissioner
from the West.

C. Privatization
In the mid-1980s Ronald Reagan proposed that the federal government
divest itself of BPA. The reaction was swift. Powerful PNW senators
attached a rider to appropriation legislation that not only prohibited the sale
of BPA and the other federal PMAs but also prohibited the Executive Branch
from even studying such a sale. This law remains in effect today. At least in
the 1980s divestiture of federal hydro assets was an idea whose time had not
come.
By the mid-1990s the sale of the smallest federal PMA, the Alaska Power
Administration had been authorized. In 1995 broader PMA sale legislation,
including a bill authored by the Clinton Administration to sell other PMAs,
including Western but not BPA, were under consideration in Congress. One
bill, which would have sold the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA,
serving customers in southeastern states) to the highest bidder, while
suspending federal environmental laws, reached the floor of the U.S. House
of Representatives. A strong effort by preference power customers, environmental and other interests blocked this legislation. No further action on
broad PMA sale bills has been taken in Congress since then.
Does this activity mean that divestiture's time has finally arrived? Probably
not, or not yet. It does mean, though, that it is an idea that will not go away
as quietly as it did in the 1980s. In particular, the results of electric industry
restructuring may provide support for the notion that it is time to get the
federal government out of the power-production business.
Those who favor privatization, or more properly "defederalization,"20 argue
that there is no reason for the federal government to own and operate hydro
facilities any more. There are others, primarily electric utilities, who could
operate the plants more efficiently and without having to depend on
congressional appropriations. In addition, proponents believe that sale of the
PMAs will reduce the federal budget deficit.

"Privatization" implies that the purchasers of federal hydro assets will always be
private entities, when public entities such as preference power customers, have expressed
interest in owning these assets.
20

18

The Issues

Those who oppose defederalization point out that federal hydro plants,
especially the large ones, are part of projects that serve many other purposes,
including irrigation, flood control, navigation, municipal water supply,
recreation and fish recovery and protection. Turning over dams and
reservoirs to utilities and others whose sole interest is in maximizing power
revenues threatens these other purposes. Moreover, opponents contend that
the only way to reduce the deficit by the sale of federal hydro facilities is to
sell them for more than the net present value of the revenues that the
facilities would have raised through the sale of power. That likely means
that the new owners will have to raise the power rates of those who
presently buy federal hydropower in order to cover the costs of their
purchases. The impact on preference power users could be significantly
higher electric rates.
In response to these contentions, some utility interests who support
defederalization say they might be willing to live with acquiring only the
power generation equipment and transmission lines, leaving the dam,
impoundment and other non-power assets in federal ownership. These
interests also point out that, since the electric transmission grid is now open,
cheap alternative sources of power are available to preference power users,
thereby keeping a lid on what the new owners might charge.21 In addition,
when preference-power users include such places towns and cities as Aspen,
Vail and Los Angeles, it is no longer fair, proponents of defederalization say,
to allocate cheap federal hydro only to these customers.
Without declaring a winner of this debate, it is safe to say that
defederalization is about money, potentially the reallocation of economic
value from one set of stakeholders to another. On the Western system the
great bulk of the value of federal hydropower (as measured by the difference
between Western's rates and the cost of power purchased from the market)
flows to Western's customers. Defederalization threatens to divert that
value from those customers to other interests, in particular, private investors
and interests outside the region. On the other hand, if defederalization were

One proposal for defederalization, set forth in "Lights out on Federal Power," by Prof.
Michael Block for the Progress and Freedom Foundation in 1996, would transfer the value
inherent in federal hydro facilities to the end-users of federal preference power through the
issuance of stock warrants. The authors hope that this would eliminate the opposition of
preference power customers to defederalization. A second aspect of their proposal
is to transfer, for free, the ownership of federal projects that contain hydro plants to "river
basin associations." These associations would be comprised of all river basin stakeholders,
including irrigators, municipal water providers, environmentalists, recreation businesses,
the states and others who would manage the projects largely free of federal interference.
The hope is that this proposal would eliminate opposition to defederalization based on
concerns regarding what might happen to the non-power purposes of defederalized projects.
Congressman John Shadegg (R-AZ) has introduced legislation (H.R.296, 105th Congress)
that would implement the first part of this proposal, but not the second part.
21
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to result in simply transferring the assets to today's customers—as was
proposed by the Clinton Administration in 1995—, the value would continue
to be allocated largely as it is today. However, the loss of federal ownership
of the assets could threaten the aquatic environment if, as has been proposed
by others, environmental laws are waived as part of the deal.
Today, there is considerable opposition to broad PMA transfer legislation. In
particular, preference power users strongly oppose it and believe that they
can stop it, especially in the U.S. Senate. Environmental organizations are
skeptical of defederalization, although they could support it under conditions
spelled out in a statement of principles attached here as Attachment D. In
the PNW, many fear the sale of BPA because it could relieve the region of the
long-term benefits of the region's cheap hydro resource. Indeed, one of the
reasons why the governors convened the four-state review committee
discussed in Section II was to stave off defederalization of BPA. The Clinton
administration, once favorable to the sale of the PMAs other than BPA, has
cooled to it.
At this point, then, the outlook for passage of broad PMA defederalization
legislation is unfavorable. What might change this outlook? Perhaps
defederalization could "move" as part of broad federal electric restructuring
legislation, although there is little to suggest that packaging defederalization
in restructuring would overcome the stiff opposition to it among preference
power users. In any event, broad restructuring legislation appears in a deep
stall in Congress, even while the states are moving ahead.
A second way in which defederalization might be given new life in Congress
is if the long-term price advantage of federal hydro disappeared. This could
happen in two ways. First, Congress might direct reforms designed to
address some of the issues discussed in subsections B and D of this section,
thereby raising the cost and price of federal hydro. Or competition in the
electric power industry may turn out to provide alternative power supplies at
costs that compare favorably with federal hydro over the long-run. Under
either or both scenarios, the long-term price advantage of federal hydro
might wane to the point where there is no clear benefit in being a preference
power customer. Neither is a likely scenario at this point in time.
The dim outlook for congressional action to allow divestiture of the PMAs has
not discouraged proposals to transfer individual, small federal water/power
projects to non-federal interests. Indeed, the BOR has offered to entertain
transfer proposals for "uncomplicated" projects, as long as they comply with
the BOR's "Framework" asset transfer principles, which include compliance
with NEPA prior to transfer. So far, no transfers that have gone through the
BOR's Framework have been sent to Congress for action. A few legislative
proposals to direct the transfer of projects that do not comply with the
Framework have been introduced in this Congress and have been met with
20
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opposition by the Administration and environmental organizations. The fate
of these proposals in Congress is uncertain.

D. Repayment and Subsidy Issues
Subsections A-C suggest that western federal hydro is in a squeeze play
between restructuring, environmental and, to a lesser extent, privatization
pressures. The other pressure under which federal hydro operates is, of
course, the requirement to pay the capital and operating costs for which
hydro is liable under federal law. To complete the picture, this subsection
briefly describes the nature and status of western hydro's repayment
obligations and related subsidy issues.
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, as of September 30, 1994,
BPA owed $17.6 billion, an increase of roughly $3 billion of debt from 1985.22
$832 million of this debt was for irrigation costs assigned to power users as
beyond the ability of the irrigators to pay.23 Western's debt was $3.7 billion,
an increase of roughly $1.4 billion from 1985.24 $1.6 billion of Western's 1994
debt is for irrigation expenses assigned to power users.25
Western's annual budgets are funded by congressional appropriations,
whereas BPA's are funded out of a revolving fund created in 1974. Both BPA
and Western must repay debt and operating costs incurred not only by them
but also by project operating agencies (the BOR and COE) that are related,
or have been assigned, to power use. BPA and Western are required to repay
operation and maintenance expenses in the same year they are incurred and
appropriated and other debt over varying repayment periods.
According to the Committee Report discussed in Section II, BPA has not
deferred a payment to the U.S. Treasury in 13 years.26 However, the report
states that, between 2002-2006, BPA owes $2.1 billion to the U.S. Treasury.27
Will BPA be able to make these payments if some of its contracts are not
renewed in 2001 and the price of electricity on the open market is competitive
with BPA's rates?

"Federal Electric Power, Operating and Financial Status of DOE's Power Marketing
Administrations, " U.S. General Accounting Office, October, 1995, Appendix II, Table II.2,
p. 42.
23
Id., Figure 5, fn 4, p. 11.
24
See fn 22.
25
See fn 23.
26
See fn 8, Committee Report, p. 15.
27
Id.
22
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Western was a subject of a 1996 GAO report that analyzed whether three
PMAs were repaying the U.S. Treasury for all power-related costs.28 While
the GAO concluded that Western was following repayment regulations, GAO
also concluded that Western was not repaying the Treasury for all powerrelated costs. For example, GAO found that Western had "deferred"
repayment of $195 million of expenses as of September 30, 1995.29 In
another report30 GAO found that Western's Pick Sloan electricity customers
were not paying for power that they use and that is generated by $454
million of hydropower and water storage facilities in the Pick-Sloan Project.
These are facilities that are now used for power production, the costs of
which were allocated to irrigation features that were never built. GAO
concluded, however, that only Congress could reallocate the costs of these
facilities to power so that they could be reimbursed to the Treasury through
power rates.
GAO also described how Western's manner of repayment of its debt
constitutes a subsidy by the taxpayer of power.31 In short, U.S. Department
of Energy policy generally requires Western to repay outstanding debt with
the highest interest rate first, regardless of maturity date. This results in a
financing subsidy by the taxpayer to the power user because it maximizes the
spread between the interest rate on Western's unamortized debt and the
higher current U.S. Treasury borrowing rates. In 1995, the GAO estimated,
this financing subsidy amounted to about $115 million.32
Under reclamation law both BPA and Western charge power users for project
irrigation-related costs which are deemed to be beyond the ability of the
irrigators to repay. Fully 43% of Western's debt to the U.S. Treasury and
about 5% of BPA's debt is tied up in these costs.33 Because there is no
interest payment on irrigation debt, the PMAs repay these costs last, when
they are due, 50 or 60 years after they were incurred. According to the GAO,
the resultant financing subsidy in 1995 on the Western system, again by the
taxpayers, this time for the benefit of both irrigators and power users, was
$137 million.34
The fact that both Western and BPA postpone repayment of irrigation costs
for which power users are responsible shows that a common perception in the

"Power Marketing Administrations, Cost Recovery, Financing, and Comparison to
Nonfederal Utilities," U.S. General Accounting Office, September, 1996.
29
Id. p. 43.
30
"Federal Power: Recovery of Federal Investment in Hydropower Facilities in the PickSloan Program," U.S. General Accounting Office, May, 1996.
31
See GAO Rept., fn 28, pp. 52-56.
32
See GAO Rept, fn 28, p. 53.
33
Percentages derived from information cited in GAO Rept., fns. 22-25.
34
See fn 28, p. 56.
28
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West—that hydro revenues are the "cash cow" used to repay the taxpayer for
the lion's share of the costs of irrigation facilities provided by reclamation
projects—is, so far, a myth. According to the U.S. GAO, the facts are as
follows:
1. Of the $16.9 billion which the BOR has determined are reimbursable
costs of the projects it has built, $7.1 billion have been allocated to
irrigation.35
2. Roughly $3.4 billion of the $7.1 has been shifted to power users as
being beyond the ability of irrigators to pay.36
3. Irrigators have also been relieved of the requirement to repay about
$373 million through legislative "charge-offs," leaving irrigators with
the responsibility to repay about $3 billion.37 Irrigators have already
repaid $945 million of the $3 billion debt as of September 30, 1994.38
4. By contrast, because of the policy described above to repay lowestand zero-interest-rate debt last, Western has repaid only $32 million
of irrigation debt, leaving $1.5 billion irrigation debt on its books as of
1994.39 By the mid-1990s, BPA had repaid no irrigation debt.40 In
short, irrigators have repaid roughly 30 times more irrigation debt to
the U.S. Treasury than power users have.
In reality, then, federal hydro has not, so far, been a cash cow for repayment
of project irrigation costs.41 Taxpayers have stepped into the void created by
the failure of power users to repay irrigation debt. Last year saw the
introduction of legislation in Congress by legislators from outside the region
to end this and other alleged federal hydro subsidies.42

35
"Bureau of Reclamation, Information on Allocation and Repayment of Costs of
Constructing Water Projects," U.S. General Accounting Office, July, 1996, p. 4.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id., p. 5.
39
See GAO Rept., fn 28, p. 56.
40
"River in Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy,"
John M. Volkman, June, 1997, p. III-36.
41
One instance of power users acting as a cash cow for irrigation is in the rates
established for "project power." Under reclamation law electric power generated at
reclamation projects is sold, first, to meet project needs, including irrigation pumping. The
rate for this "project power" is set to recover only the costs of operation, maintenance and
replacement of producing the power, but not the cost of the original power investment. Yet,
the costs of that share of the original power investment used to generate pumping needs
must be repaid by someone. They are, by power users, through power rates that are
higher than project power rates.
42
H.R. 3878, by Representatives Franks, Meehan and others, 104th Congress.
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IV. Conclusion
We believe the foregoing sustains the following statements and suggests the
following questions about western hydro:
A. Hydro makes a significant contribution to power supplies in the West,
especially in the PNW where it provides about two-thirds of that
region's generation capacity. Policies adopted for hydro can have farranging effects on the region's economy and environment.
B. Restructuring does not really threaten the viability of western hydro,
likely even if hydropower pays its share of environmental costs, except
where hydropower sales have been asked to recover costs unrelated to
hydro, in particular, nuclear power plant costs.
C. The sales of hydropower by Western are worth billions of dollars
when measured against the alternatives available in the western grid.
This value now flows almost exclusively to preference power users.
Should some of this value flow to achieve other goals, say deficit
reduction or environmental mitigation?
E. A distant federal agency, the FERC, will be making many of the
trade-offs between energy and environmental policies on western
rivers in the next ten to fifteen years, especially in the PNW. Is this
appropriate?
F. PMA privatization (aka defederalization) fever has cooled some since
1995, but, this time, it will not likely disappear. The two main issues
raised by defederalization are: Who gets the value of the hydro
systems, as measured by the difference between their cost and the
price of power on the open market? And what is the impact on the
environment? Will the West be prepared for federal hydro
defederalization next time it is seriously considered by Congress?
G. Federal hydro's debt to the U.S. Treasury is substantial and
increasing. And it appears that neither Western nor BPA is making
the taxpayer whole. In particular, the American taxpayer is
subsidizing power users because neither Western nor BPA is yet
repaying irrigation debt in any substantial amounts, contrary to
popular perception. Will this arrangement be altered by Congress?
Should it be?
In sum, there are large decisions to make about western hydro in the years to
come, involving difficult trade-offs and large impacts on the region. In our
view this requires that the public, politicians and others beyond the "inside
players" learn the issues and stay involved.
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Attachment A
Federal Hydroelectric Power Plants in the Northwest
(Hydropower Marketed by the Bonneville Power Administration)
Plant

River/State

Operator

Size
(MW)

Albeni Falls

Pend/Idaho

COE*

22

Anderson Ranch

Boise/Idaho

BOR*

36

Big Cliff

Santiam/Oregon

COE

21

Black Canyon

Payette/Idaho

BOR

9

Bonneville

Columbia/Washington

COE

1,147

Chandler

Yakima/Washington

BOR

10

Chief Joseph

Columbia/Washington

COE

2,543

Cougar

McKenzie/Oregon

COE

25

Detroit

Santiam/Oregon

COR

96

Dexter

Willamette/Oregon

COE

17

Dworshak

Clearwater/Idaho

COE

445

Foster

Santiam/Oregon

COE

22

Grand Coulee

Columbia/Washington

BOR

6,448

Green Peter

Santiam/Washington

COE

79

Hills Creek

Willamette/Oregon

COE

30

Hungry Horse

Flathead/Montana

BOR

354

Ice Harbor

Snake/Washington

COE

567

John Day

Columbia/Oregon/Washington

COE

2,080

Libby

Kootenai/Montana

COE

567

Little Goose

Snake/Washington

COE

797

Lookout Point

Willamette/Oregon

COE

67

Lost Creek

Rogue/Oregon

COE

18

Lower Granite

Snake/Washington

COE

815

Lower Monumental

Snake/Washington

COE

799

McNary

Columbia/Oregon/Washington

COE

985

Minidoka

Snake/Idaho

BOR

13

Palisades

Snake/Idaho

BOR

122

Roza

Yakima/Washington

BOR

4

The Dalles

Columbia/Oregon/Washington

COE

2,074

Total (29)
* Army Corps of Engineers (21 dams) and Bureau of Reclamation (8 dams)
Source: Bonneville Power Administration
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Attachment B
Federal Dams in California and the Interior West
(Hydroelectric Power Marketed by Western Area Power Administration)
Plant

River/State

Operator

Size
(MW)

Hoover

Colorado/Arizona/Nevada

BOR

2,074

J.F. Carr

Clear Creek/California

BOR

154

Folsom

American/California

BOR

215

Keswick

Sacramento/California

BOR

105

New Melones

Stanislaus/California

BOR

383

Nimbus

American/California

BOR

14

O’Neill

San Luis/California

BOR

29

Shasta

Sacramento/California

BOR

578

Spring Creek

Spring Creek/California

BOR

200

Trinity

Trinity/California

BOR

140

Gianelli

San Luis/California

BOR

202

Amistad

Rio Grande/Texas

IBWC

66

Falcon

Rio Grande/Texas

IBWC

32

Big Thompson

Trans. Mt./Colorado

BOR

5

Estes

Trans. Mt./Colorado

BOR

51

Flatiron

Trans. Mt./Colorado

BOR

95

Green Mountain

Blue/Colorado

BOR

30

Mary’s Lake

Trans. Mt. Div.

BOR

8

Mount Elbert

Arkansas/Colorado

BOR

206

Pole Hill

Trans. Mt./Colorado

BOR

33

Yellowtail 1/2

Bighorn/Montana

BOR

144

Alcova

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

40

Boysen

Wind/Wyoming

BOR

18

Buffalo Bill

Shoshone/Wyoming

BOR

18

Fremont Canyon

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

66

Glendo

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

38

Guernsey

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

7

Heart Mountain

Shoshone/Wyoming

BOR

5

Kortes

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

39

Pilot Butte

Wind/Wyoming

BOR

2

Seminoe

North Platte/Wyoming

BOR

51

Conclusion

Federal Dams in California and the Interior West (continued)
(Hydroelectric power marketed by Western Area Power Administration)
Plant

River/State

Operator

Size
(MW)

Shoshone

Shoshone/Wyoming

BOR

3

Spirit Mountain

Shoshone/Wyoming

BOR

5

Davis

Colorado/Arizona

BOR

269

Parker

Colorado/California

BOR

69

Canyon Ferry

Missouri/Montana

BOR

60

Fort Peck

Missouri/Montana

COE

218

Yellowtail 3/4

Big Horn/Montana

BOR

144

Garrison

Missouri/North Dakota

COE

546

Big Bend

Missouri/South Dakota

COE

538

Fort Randall

Missouri/South Dakota

COE

387

Gavins Point

Missouri/South Dakota

COE

122

Oahe

Missouri/South Dakota

COE

786

Glen Canyon

Colorado/Arizona

BOR

1,356

Blue Mesa

Gunnison/Colorado

BOR

96

Crystal

Gunnison/Colorado

BOR

28

Lower Molina

Pipeline/Colorado

BOR

5

Morrow Point

Gunnison/Colorado

BOR

156

Taowac

Canal/Colorado

BOR

11

Upper Molina

Pipeline/Colorado

BOR

9

Elephant Butte

Rio Grande/New Mexico

BOR

28

Flaming Gorge

Green/Utah

BOR

152

Fontenelle

Green/Wyoming

BOR

13

Stampede

Truckee/California

BOR

3

Total

10,605

* Bureau of Reclamation (46 dams), Army Corps of Engineers (6 dams), International Water
Boundary Commission (2 dams)
Source: Western Area Power Administration
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Attachment C
Hydroelectric Dams in the West
(10 MW or Larger)
Subject to Relicensing: 1997-2010
Year
1997

Project Name
North Umpqua
Lower Salmon

Owner
Pacificorp
Idaho Power Company

Total
1998

Bliss

Big Creek #4
Upper Salmon
Shoshone Falls

Idaho Power Company

Oneida
Hat Creek 1&2
C.J. Strike

SCE
Idaho Power Company
Idaho Power Company

Cabinet Gorge
Yale
Grace & Cove
Mayfield
Round Butte

Pacificorp
Pacific Gas & Electric
Idaho Power Company

Box Canyon
El Dorado

Washington Water
Pacificorp
Pacificorp
City of Tacoma
Conf. Tribes/Portland

Soda
Poe
Pit
Total

211.50
108.00
40.50
460.00
398.66
1,218.66

Pend Oreille CO PUD
Pacific Gas and Electric

Total
2003

30.00
20.00
82.80
132.00

Total
2002

91.00
34.50
12.50
138.00

Total
2001

75.00
75.00

Total
2000

262.75
60.00
322.75

Total
1999

Size
(MW)

60.00
20.00
80.00

Pacificorp
Pacific Gas and Electric
Pacific Gas and Electric

14.00
142.83
317.00
473.83

Conclusion

Hydroelectric Dams in the West (continued)
(10 MW or Larger)
Subject to Relicensing: 1997-2010
Year

Project Name

2004

Chelan
Malad
Feather River
Bull Run
Donnells & Beardsley
Tulloch
Stanislaus Spring
Willamette

Owner
Chelan County PUD 1
Idaho Power Company
Pacific Gas and Electric
Portland General Electric
Oakdale & San Joaquin ID
Oakdale & San Joaquin ID
Pacific Gas and Electric
Portland General Electric

Total
2005

Portal
Kern Canyon
Noxon Rapids
Prospect 1, 2, & 4
Hells Canyon
Priest Rapids

Klamath
Swift #1
Baker
Swift #2
Rocky Reach
Oak Grove
North Fork

SCE
Pacific Gas and Electric
Washington Water & Power
Pacificorp
Idaho Power Company
Grant County PUD 2

Feather River
Upper American
Spokane River
Mammoth Pool

Pacificorp
Pacificorp
Puget Sound Power & Light
Cowlitz County PUD #1
Chelan County PUD #1
Portland General Electric
Portland General Electric

Trail Bridge
Total

231.00
204.00
324.80
70.00
1,213.15
51.03
91.90
2,185.08

Cal. Department of Water
Sacramento MUD
Washington Water & Power
SCE

Total
2008

10.00
11.50
460.12
36.76
1,166.50
1,877.80
3,562.68

Total
2007

48.00
21.77
342.02
21.00
63.99
17.10
175.80
22.50
712.18

Total
2006

Size
(MW)

2,165.75
722.26
121.55
181.00
3,190.56

City of Eugene

124.50
124.50
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Hydroelectric Dams in the West (continued)
(10 MW or Larger)
Subject to Relicensing: 1997-2010
Year
2009

Project Name
Big Creek #2A & 8
Big Creek #3
Big Creek #1 & 2
South Fork
Boulder Canyon
Merwin
Mystic Lake

Owner
SCE
SCE
SCE
Oroville/Wyandotte ID
Public Service of Colorado
Pacificorp
Montana Power Company

Total
2010

Packwood Lake
Ames & Tacoma
Swan Falls

480.07
177.45
225.90
104.10
20.00
136.00
10.00
1,153.52

Washington Public Power
Public Service of Colorado
Idaho Power Company

Total
TOTAL (1997-2010)
Source: Relicense Forecast 1993-2010, FERC, December, 1993
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Size
(MW)

26.13
11.60
25.00
62.73
13,431.49

Attachment D

Statement of Principles for the Transfer of Federal Water and
Power Facilities and Related Assets to Non-Federal Interests
American Rivers
Environmental Defense Fund
Grand Canyon Trust
Land and Water Fund of the Rockies
National Audubon Society
Natural Resources Defense Council
Sierra Club Southwest Office
Southern Environmental Law Center
Southwest Environmental Center
Western Colorado Congress
August 29, 1996
Congress and the Administration are considering proposals to transfer
federal water and power facilities and related assets to non-federal entities.
These transfers could have detrimental impacts on the environment and
other interests. Such transfers, however, can provide opportunities to
mitigate past environmental damage and otherwise enhance the
environment. Therefore, transfers should be authorized and approved only
under conditions that enhance the environment and provide continuing
protection of other public interests, as follows:
1. Fair Price.—The federal taxpayer is entitled to a fair price for any
facilities or assets transferred, one that should be set in light of the
market value of the facilities. At a minimum, no federal water or
power facility should be transferred for a price less than the present
value of all associated outstanding repayment obligations, irrespective
of adjustments or of the allocation of facility or asset costs among
different uses. In addition, the value of any land or other non-water
or non-power assets transferred, as well as the present value of any
other anticipated receipts to the U.S. Treasury, should either be added
to the minimum price or, preferably, reflected in environmental
improvements, including ecologically beneficial land given by the
transferee, determined as a result of sections 4 and 5, below.

2. Federal Control.—Some federal water and power facilities play a
critical role in watershed and river management for multiple purposes
or in the interstate or international allocation of resources. Control of
these facilities should be retained by the federal government.

Western Hydropower: Changing Values/New Visions

3. Compliance with Environmental Laws.—All transfers should comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act,
and other federal environmental laws. All transferred facilities
should operate in full compliance with such laws.
4. Facility-specific Transfer Plans.—Transfers should be carried out only
pursuant to facility-specific plans developed by the applicable federal
agencies with the input of all stakeholders. The plans should contain
minimum terms and conditions that will require transferees to:
a. protect existing water resource values that could be affected by the
transfer;
b. mitigate environmental damage, including damage to fish and
wildlife, and otherwise enhance the environment;
c. promote the protection and restoration of threatened and
endangered species, through measures which may include
development and implementation of a habitat conservation plan;
d. use any power generation or transmission facilities consistently
with national energy policy, especially to support non-hydroelectric
renewable resources; and
e

avoid adverse impacts on the federal government's ability to fulfill
its treaty and trust responsibilities to Indian tribes.

5. Competitive Bidding .—Once the above minimum terms and
conditions are established, the choice of a transferee and the final
transfer price should be made on the basis of bids obtained
competitively, in which both price and non-price terms are evaluated.

6. FERC License.—Facility-specific transfer plans which include
hydroelectric facilities must be incorporated into a special, one-time,
temporary FERC license, which should be enforceable as if it were a
conventional FERC license. Upon expiration of the special license, a
transferee must obtain and operate facilities pursuant to a FERC
license issued under the Federal Power Act and other laws applicable
to non-federal hydropower facilities, without waiver.
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Conclusion

7. Public Oversight.—There should be full disclosure of and access to all
information material to a full and fair evaluation of any transfer
proposal. Appropriate mechanisms for ongoing public oversight of any
transferred facilities must be provided so as to assure compliance with
the terms and conditions of the transfer.
8. Impact on the Federal Budget.—For federal budgetary purposes, net
transfer proceeds should reflect both the total receipts from the
transfer as well as the total expected revenues foregone by the U.S.
Treasury, using the same time periods and discount rates for each
revenue stream.
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